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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court in a civil case 
unci «..'in nu- court granted a motion for summary judgment. This Court has jurisdiction 
1 >i i/n ;i u u it 1 < >l Jti i h C c i :I ; ; \ nm »l i ited § 78 2 2(3)( j) ( West 2006). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Because the trial court granted dismissal pursuant to I Jtah Rule Civil Procedure 54, 
• • I . > i * inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to" the 
appellant and "in deciding ^ i MM'H • • .•.!'•.• • i-.m. i^  ; 
of law to the prevailing party, we give no deferenee to the trial court's view of the law; we 
review u I wr correctness." Utah State Coalition of St. Citizens v. Utah Power and Light 
Issue #1: 
A general contractor retaining control over any part of an independent contractor's work 
must exercise that power with reasonable care. Ric-T) retained control over and actively 
"Issue #2: 
A general contractor with supervisory power to forbid work being done in a dangerous 
i"*1" :'u u -,• ,«'• « *•! i ••':. I.!.-. Mipcrvisory control. liig-l) retained 
and exercised control over safet\ h\ 'nkm;m*'M*1 • .! ;•!. H , 
regulations. 
1 
Statutes at Issue 
None at issue in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As Wall 39 began to collapse on the afternoon of March 1, 2004, Big D 
superintendents Kevin Burns and Dee Jacobson stood watching. (R. 519, 631-33, 612-13, 
865-66). They continued watching as four workers rode the wall to the ground. (Id.). 
After the collapse of the wall, three workers walked away virtually unscathed, while 
Michael Begay lost his life. (Id.). 
Earlier that day, Kevin Burns sent the four workers, employees of subcontractor 
Preferred Builders, to work on Wall 39. (R. 865). Big D Construction, acting as the 
general contractor over the project, retained control over workflow, timing and 
sequencing. (R. 514, 520-21). Big D's control extended to direction over subcontractors 
to coordinate and arrange the timing of tasks. (R. 521). However, at the time Kevin 
Burns directed Preferred to begin work on wall 39, his instruction and permission to 
begin work on that wall deviated from the sequencing and workflow set forth by Big D's 
own schedule. Specifically, walls were to be erected by (1) placing a concrete form and 
imbeds by Big D; followed by, (2) installation of reinforcing steel by Preferred; and, 
completed by (3) placing another concrete form and pouring the cement by Big D. (R. 
527 and 910-911). Big-D superintendents uniformly agree that construction of the walls 
represented a cooperative effort between Big-D and Preferred Builders. (R. 524-525). 
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At the time Kevin Burns directed Preferred Builders to begin working on wall 39 
the interior form had not yet been placed and, indeed, no form was even available to be 
placed. (R. 525). By erecting an interior form, Big-D provided a stable platform to 
which the otherwise freestanding rebar steel could be tied as Preferred Builders worked 
upwards. (R. 524). Another method which provided support while a freestanding rebar 
wall was erected involved waiting for an adjacent wall to have concrete poured and cured, 
and then tie off to that wall. (R. 525-526, 899 at 19:19-21:12). No wall was available to 
which wall 39 could be tied off. 
A central and basic principle in construction work involves whether a particular 
task is considered "constructible." The constructibility principle is defined as "the 
optimum use of construction knowledge and experience in planning, design, engineering, 
procurement, and field operations, to achieve overall project objectives." (R. 762). 
Obviously, the project objectives do not include unintentional collapse of structures 
during construction. (Id.). Big D project manager Layne Murray understood 
constructibility principles as follows: "Q. [I]t's kind of hard to put a roof up if you don't 
have something to support it. A. Exactly... you can't have a roof without walls in place or 
a structure in place to support it and that's exactly what I mean." (R. 527). 
By directing Preferred Builders to begin work on wall 39 Kevin Burns sent 
Preferred to build without a structure in place to support the construction, he violated 
basic principles of constructibility. (R. 527, 762). Importantly, at the time Kevin Burns 
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directed Preferred Builders to begin working on wall 39, Big D could have instructed 
Preferred Builders to either: (1) go home for the day; or, (2) go to work installing 
reinforcing rebar steel on a wall which was not tall enough to supporting structures. (R. 
523). 
Big D retained the ability to direct and control Preferred Builders workflow, 
sequence, and timing. (R. 520). In exercising this control, Kevin Burns generally 
directed Preferred Builders where to go next. (R. 520-21). Preferred Builders employee 
Todd Jex testified that htQ. You understood Big D's position to be one where they could 
issue directions to you and you had to follow them? A. that's pretty much what I did the 
whole job." (R. 514). Any instructions given by Big D to Preferred Builders were 
considered binding. (R. 515-16). Big D regularly exercised their control over 
subcontractors work flow, sequence, and timing. (R. 521-22). 
Preferred employee Todd Jex understood that Big D superintendent Kevin Burns 
"was over getting the forms and that up for us, you know, getting things ready, and we 
would follow behind him and do whatever he needed to do to make a pour." (R. 522). 
However, Todd Jex testified regarding wall 39 that they began working wall 39 in order 
to keep ahead of Big D's operations. (Id.). Moreover, it was not unusual for Big D to 
push Preferred Builders rebar work to stay ahead of Big D carpenters. "You know, they 
was always pushing us to keep ahead and keep ahead." (R. 522-23). 
Kevin Burns gave direction to begin working on wall 39 because that was "where 
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they would be headed next." (R. 518-19, 865). According to Preferred employee Todd 
Jex, Big D "[t]ells us they want this wall built and this wall built. Q. Then you go build it? 
A. Yes." (R. 521). Todd Jex went to work on wall 39 in order to "get ahead of [Big D]" 
because according to Kevin Burns that was "his next plan of attack." (R. 787, 865-66). 
Big D and Preferred jointly decided to begin wall 39 ahead of the forms. "[W]e just 
agreed that would be a good place to go." (R. 788). 
Similar to the control and authority Big D assumed over subcontractor workflow, 
timing and sequencing, Big D also assumed and retained control over enforcement of 
safety regulations on site. As general contractor on site Big D remained solely 
responsible for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and 
programs. (R. 510-11). Under the construction contract Big D "shall take reasonable 
precautions for the safety of, and shall provide reasonable protection to prevent damage, 
injury or a loss to: (1) employees on the work and other persons who may be affected 
thereby." (Id.). Big D also acknowledged, and it remained uncontroverted in the trial 
court below, that they, the prime contractor, carried responsibility for subcontractor 
compliance with OSHA regulations. (R. 512-13). Ultimately, under the contract, "in no 
case shall the prime contractor be relieved of overall responsibility for compliance with 
the requirements" regarding safety regulations and enforcement. (R. 512). 
Big D routinely undertook to enforce safety regulations. During the course of 
construction, Big D interfered with subcontractor work on more than 43 separate 
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occasions. (R. 514). Whenever a subcontractor engaged in work which created an unsafe 
condition or violated an OSHA standard, Big D asserted its authority. (R. 513-15). Big 
D actively inserted itself in all manner of subcontractor work minutia, including wearing 
seat belts while operating equipment and actively checking subcontractor equipment to 
make sure backup alarms were functioning. (R. 513). Big D intervened in subcontractor 
trenching work a total of 12 different times. (Id.). On these occasions, Big D actually 
stopped work and refused subcontractors the ability to continue working where their work 
failed to comply with OSHA bracing requirements. (R. 515). 
Wall 39 collapsed as a result of bracing which violated both OSHA and ANSI 
regulations. (R. 520). Both Kevin Burns and Dee Jacobsen stood watching as wall 39 
was being built had the OSHA and ANSI standards available for their reference. (R. 519-
20). Further, Dee Jacobsen agreed that it was his particular job to predict and eliminate 
hazards, even for the benefit of subcontractors. (R. 512). Big D superintendent Kevin 
Burns similarly agreed that it was his job to bring subcontractors into compliance with 
OSHA and ANSI standards. (R. 513). Big D employees and safety personnel agree that, 
absent the ability to complete work in compliance with ANSI and OSHA, work should be 
stopped until it can be brought into compliance. (R. 523). Instead, Kevin Burns led Todd 
Jex to wall 39, a quicker method and sequence. (R. 524). Following the collapse of wall 
39 and death of Michael Begay, Big D erected a form for support in order to complete 
wall 39. (R. 526). 
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Finally, Kevin Burns had at his disposal the ability to request Preferred Builders 
conduct a "Hazard Analysis" prior to beginning work on wall 39. Prior to beginning any 
new or unusual task, Big D could ask subcontractors to perform a "Hazard Analysis." (R. 
516). According to Big D's safety employee Todd Manley, "what we are looking for in 
doing a hazard analysis is principal steps, hazards associated with those principal steps, 
and controls to put in place to reduce, eliminate, or minimize hazards associated with the 
principal steps of that task." (R. 516). 
Big D superintendents, such as Kevin Burns, understood that a hazard analysis 
should be conducted whenever something out of the ordinary course of construction was 
about to be undertaken. (R. 516-17). Wall 39 was considered to be a task "odd to the 
standard of the job." (R. 518). Kevin Burns, before directing Preferred Builders to begin 
work on wall 39, understood wall 39fs unique and out of the ordinary nature. (R. 517-19, 
649-50). Big D did not request a hazard analysis before sending Preferred to work wall 
39. (R. 519). More unfortunate, if Big D had requested a hazard analysis, the deficient 
method of bracing would most likely have been discovered and remedied. (R. 519, 761). 
Don Rigtrup, a compliance safety and health officer with experience working for 
Utah State Industrial Commission, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, reviewed 
the facts, documents, and depositions in this case. On completing his review, Mr. Rigtrup 
concluded that Big D pervasively involved itself in its subcontractor safety. (R. 761). 
Mr. Rigtrup concluded that Big D's failure to request a job hazard analysis directly led to 
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the collapse of wall 39 as the deficiencies in bracing would have been discovered if a 
hazard analysis had been conducted. (Id.). Mr. Rigtrup further concluded that Kevin 
Burns failure to review the ANSI and OSHA standards prior to sending Big D to work 
wall 39 also contributed to the collapse of the wall. (Id.). Mr. Rigtrup also concluded 
that Kevin Burns should have directed Big D to begin work on walls which did not 
require additional bracing. (R. 762). Similarly, by deviating from Big D's own concrete 
pour schedule, Kevin Burns directed Preferred Builders to begin working on a wall which 
was doomed to fail from the outset, thereby violating principles of constructibility. (Id.). 
Finally, Mr. Rigtrup relied upon a publication by the American Society of Civil Engineers 
in concluding that because Big D controlled the equipment (forms), and controlled the 
sequence (both in the construction of individual walls and the sequence of which wall 
would be worked on next), Big D remained primarily responsible for maintaining the 
safety of Preferred Builders employees. (R. 762-63). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Big D's retention of control over workflow and sequencing required that Big D 
exercise that control with reasonable care. In this case, Big D directed Preferred Builders 
to begin working on a freestanding rebar wall for which no adequate support existed. Big 
D could have sent Preferred to work other walls which did not need support. Instead, Big 
D steered Preferred to work wall 39 because that is where Big D would be headed next. 
Big D controlled the means by which freestanding rebar walls could be supported, 
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erection of one side of the concrete form. Big D's direction to begin work on wall 39 
without the benefit of adequate support from an adjoining wall or concrete forms violated 
basic principles of constructibility. In directing Preferred Builders to begin work on wall 
39, Big D breached their duty to exercise their retained powers with reasonable care. 
Big D also oversaw and controlled on-site safety regulation. Prior to the collapse 
of wall 39 Big D regularly and frequently interfered with subcontractor work on-site. 
Whenever Big D superintendents and safety personnel observed a subcontractor 
performing work in a manner which violated either OSHA, ANSI or general safety 
standards, Big D would either require the subcontractor to come into compliance or stop 
the subcontractors work in its entirety until safety compliance could be achieved. In this 
case, Big D failed to fulfil their continuing duty to ensure and oversee safety compliance 
where wall 39 collapsed as direct consequence of failure to comply with OSHA and 
ANSI. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction and Background 
Originally, the legal doctrine of respondeat superior "made negligence of a servant 
committed in pursuance of his employment the negligence of the master." Globe Grain & 
Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 91 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1939). The independent 
contractor exception to the general rule of liability was based on "freedom from control in 
methods and means." Id In short, an employer should not be responsible where no right 
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of control over the employee existed because of the inability to control the methods or 
means of the independent contractor. Id. 
Globe Grain observed that this exception to respondeat superior led to creation of 
independent contractors in word only, not in spirit. "An old servant who knew his 
master's wants and desires as to how things should be done might be made an 
independent contractor in legal form." Id. Similarly, a "cotton picker could be given the 
aspect of an independent contractor." Id. Accordingly, and in spite of an apparent status 
as an independent contractor, the court held that "[i]n such cases the principle of 
respondeat superior might still apply." Id. 
Again in 1937 Utah courts acknowledged the ability to control as the deciding 
factor in determining whether an employer may be held liable, despite any alleged 
independent status. In Gleason v. Salt Lake City, a store requested Salt Lake City Fire 
Department ("SLCFD") to pump water from an elevator shaft and SLCFD agreed to do 
so. SLCFD ran a hose across the public sidewalk. Plaintiff tripped on the hose and 
claimed negligence against the store. The store won on directed verdict at close of 
Plaintiffs evidence. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the test to determine if the store 
remained liable must be whether the store held the "right or power of control of the 
[SLCFD] employees." Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah 
1937). The court agreed that the store could be liable if there existed a right or power of 
control over the employees. "Plaintiff is correct in stating the law, but there is no 
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evidence in the record which tends to prove that the company retained the right to 
control." Id. 
Going back to 1914 Utah courts recognized that a general contractor may be held 
liable where they retain control. Employers of independent contractors remain liable 
where "the employer reserved or exercised the right to superintend, direct or control the 
work... where the will and discretion of the contractor as to the time and manner of doing 
the work or the means and methods of accomplishing the results were subordinate and 
subject to that of the [general contractor]." Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408, 411 
(1914). It is undisputed in this case that Big D retained and actively exercised the right to 
superintend, direct and control the work of Preferred. 
The common and consistent thread throughout all of these cases, and reaffirmed in 
modern decisions, is that the ability to control the subcontractor remains the key in 
determining whether liability may be imposed against the employer. "[A] principal 
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work 
if the employer is actively involved, or asserts control over, the manner of performance 
of the contracted work." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, % 18, 979 P.2d 322 (emphasis 
added). The principle by which the employer may be held liable for injuries to an 
independent contractor is still referred to as the "Retained Control Doctrine." Id. at 114. 
Big D admittedly controlled the workflow, timing and sequence of Preferred 
Builders. Big D employees agreed that building walls was a cooperative effort and Big D 
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frequently provided forms on which to tie off a freestanding rebar wall for support. Big 
D further controlled and enforced safety on the jobsite, regularly interfering with 
subcontractor work to the point of prohibiting any further work from being done. Big D's 
failure to exercise reasonable care in both sequencing and the enforcement of safety 
regulations led directly to the collapse of wall 39. 
The directions and control exerted by Big D left Preferred Builders with no real 
choice in the bracing method. Big D directed Preferred Builders to work on wall 39. Big 
D could have sent Preferred Builders home for the day. Big D could have directed 
Preferred to work on another wall which did not require bracing. Big D knew that no 
form was available to provide support for wall 39. Big D wanted to keep the rebar work 
progressing ahead of the formwork in order to save time. So, Big D directed Preferred to 
begin work on wall 39. Big D created the environment and conditions which led to the 
collapse. By instructing Preferred where to work next, Big D violated basic principles of 
constructibility. 
In negligence cases, summary judgment is "appropriate only in the most clear-cut 
case." Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982) 
[W]hen it comes to determining negligence, contributory negligence, and 
causation, courts are not in such a good position to make a total determination for 
here enters a prerogative of the jury to make a determination of its own, and that is: 
Did the conduct of a party measure up to that of the reasonably prudent man, and, 
if not, was it a proximate cause of the harm done? 
Bowen, 656 P.2d at 436-37. At best, Big D's motion for summary judgment raises an 
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issue regarding apportionment of fault between Big D and Preferred Builders. Further, 
the uncontested affidavit and testimony of Don Rigtrup raises genuine issues of material 
fact regarding whether Big D acted reasonably in exercising their retained control. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted Big D's motion because Big D must be 
held to account for their negligent actions leading to the death of Michael Begay. 
Additionally, in light of the uncontroverted evidence presented regarding Big D's 
retention and exertion of control, the trial court erred in denying the Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment that, as a matter of law, Big D indeed owed a duty in this case. 
I. BIG D'S CONTROL OVER AND PARTICIPATION IN 
SUBCONTRACTOR WORK REQUIRED THE EXERCISE OF 
REASONABLE CARE. 
When a general contractor retains control over any aspect of a subcontractor's 
work, they must exercise reasonable care. Under the Restatement of Torts, § 414 "One 
who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of 
the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others... caused by his failure to 
exercise his control with reasonable care." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414 (1969). 
Importantly, the plain language of § 414 does not limit the application of liability at 
common law, it expands it. The commentary itself notes that only "some" control is 
needed before liability will attach. Id. at cmt. b. This Court adopted Section 414 in 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22. 
The level or degree of control does not need to rise to the same level which an 
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employer would have over their employees. Rather, "the typical instance in which such 
an exertion of control might occur is 'when a principal contractor entrusts a part of the 
work to subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman superintends the entire job.'" 
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, f 21 (quoting Rest. 2d Torts § 414, cmt. b). Big D not only 
superintended the entirety of the job, they actually participated in the cooperative effort of 
building a wall. 
Big D controlled and directed the timing and sequencing of subcontractors. 
Specifically, Big D retained the ability to control and direct Preferred's work schedule. 
"Work must comply with project managers schedule." (R. 520). Kevin Burns was the 
Big D employee who directed Preferred Builders where to go next. "[Y]ou mean Kevin 
would be able to direct Preferred as to where to go next? THE WITNESS: Yes." (Id.). 
Preferred employee Todd Jex testified: "Q. You understand Big-D's position to be one 
where they could issue directions to you and you had to follow them? A. That's pretty 
much what I did the whole job." (R. 514). Finally, any instructions given by Big D to 
Preferred Builders were considered binding. (R. 515-16). Not only did Big D control the 
direction and work sequence of subcontractors, they actually exercised that control over 
the subcontractors. (R. 521). 
Preferred employee Todd Jex understood that Kevin Burns "was over getting the 
forms and that up for us, you know, getting things ready, and we would follow behind 
him and do whatever he needed to do to make a pour." (R. 522). Todd Jex testified 
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regarding wall 39 specifically that they began working in order to keep ahead of Big D's 
concrete pour operations. (Id.). Further, Big D pushed Preferred Builders rebar workers 
to stay ahead of Big D carpenters. "You know, they was always pushing us to keep ahead 
and keep ahead." (R. 522-23). Before beginning work on wall 39, Big D superintendent 
Kevin Burns gave guidance to Preferred that wall 39 was 'where they would be headed 
next' and directed Preferred to begin work on that wall. (R. 518). Superintendent Kevin 
Burns knew that no forms were available or in place which could support the freestanding 
rebar. (R. 526). 
Prior to the collapse of wall 39, several rebar walls had been erected by using Big 
D forms for stabilization during the build. (R. 525). However, the faster method of 
construction is to erect the rebar without benefit of a form for stabilization. By building 
the rebar ahead of the forms, Big D carpenters are "not waiting on us [Preferred 
Builders]." (R. 524). Big D superintendents agreed that building walls was a 
"cooperative effort" between the rebar subcontractor, Preferred, and Big D. (Id.). "Q. 
Big D and Preferred are essentially working together to build a wall? A. Yes." (R. 
525). Following the collapse of wall 39 and death of Michael Begay, Big D erected a 
form for support in order to complete wall 39. (R. 526). 
Big D's "Concrete Pour Schedule" set the sequence for building walls. The 
schedule called for placing an interior concrete form, Big D's job. (R. 527). Next, Big 
D's schedule called for installation of rebar, Preferred's task, followed by placement of 
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another concrete form by Big D. (Id.). "Set interior form and miscellaneous imbeds. 
Install reinforcing steel. ... Set exterior form and pour." (Id.). However, Kevin Burns 
directed Preferred Builders to begin work on wall 39 knowing that no form was available 
to provide support. (R. 525). Erecting the interior form first provides a stable platform 
on which to tie off the otherwise freestanding rebar. (R. 524). By deviating from their 
own schedule, Big D's superintendent Kevin Burns violated basic principles of 
constmctibility. (R. 527). 
Big-D Project Manager Layne Murray testified that failing to follow basic 
constmctibility principles is like trying to build a roof without any walls for support. "Q. 
[I]t's kind of hard to put a roof up if you don't have something to support it. A. Exactly... 
You can't have a roof without walls in place or a structure in place to support it, and that's 
exactly what I mean." (Id.). 
Another method of sequencing the work to create a stable platform on which to 
build the rebar involved waiting until concrete was poured and cured on an adjacent wall. 
However, that sequencing remained within the control of Big D, not Preferred Builders. 
(R. 525-26). By directing the construction of wall 39 next, Big D ignored constmctibility 
principles. According to Plaintiffs expert Don Rigtrup, by violating these basic 
principles of constmctibility and sequencing, Kevin Burns directed Preferred Builders to 
begin working on a wall which was doomed to fail from the outset because of inadequate 
support. (R. 527). 
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A contractor who retains control over a subcontractor's work is actively 
participating in that subcontractor's work. "Under the 'active participation' standard, a 
principal employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its independent 
contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts control over, the 
manner of performance of the contracted work." Thompson, 1999 UT 22,119. In 
Thompson, this Court relied on Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W. 2d 415 (Tex. 1985). 
In Redinger, the general contractor retained control over subcontractors, 
specifically, "the power to direct the order in which the work was to be done and to forbid 
the work being done in a dangerous manner." Id. at 418. A supervisor for the general 
contractor directed a subcontractor to go to work in a particular location, leading to the 
injury of another subcontractor's employee. A jury apportioned fault to both the general 
contractor and the allegedly independent subcontractor. The Texas Supreme Court 
affirmed because of the evidence that the general contractor "retained the power to direct 
the order in which the work was done." Id. 
Here, similarly, there exists an issue of comparative fault between Big D and 
Preferred Builders. Issues of fault apportionment should be left to the jury, not decided 
on summary judgment. Bowen, 656 P.2d at 436-37. Big D could have sent Preferred 
Builders home for the day. (R. 523). Big D could have directed Preferred to work on 
another wall which did not require a form for bracing. Big D knew that no form was 
available to provide support for wall 39. Big D wanted to keep the rebar work 
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progressing ahead of the formwork in order to save time. So, Big D directed Preferred to 
begin work on wall 39. The directions and control exerted by Big D left Preferred 
Builders with no real choice in the bracing method. Big D created the environment and 
conditions which led to the collapse. By instructing Preferred where to work next, Big D 
violated basic principles of constructibility. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it 
dismissed Big D because Big D failed to exercise, with reasonable care, the control which 
it retained over the method, sequencing and manner of Preferred Builder's work. 
II. BY EXERCISING CONTROL OVER ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY 
REGULATIONS, BIG D OWED AN OBLIGATION TO EXERCISE 
THEIR CONTROL WITH REASONABLE CARE. 
General contractors over a construction project remain liable for maintaining the 
safety of both their own employees as well subcontractor employees. The scope and 
breadth of the duty created by the OSHA standards regarding general contractors has been 
set out by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. In the cases of 
Arming - Johnson Co., OSHRC Docket Nos. 3694 and 4409, 1975-1976 CCH OSHD 
paragraph 20690 4 BNA OSHC 1193; and Secretary of Labor v. Dynamic Painting Corp. 
(1995, OSHRC ALJ) 17 BNA OSHC 1086 the commission has ruled and reaffirmed that 
the general contractor may be held in violation of safety regulations, even though it had 
no employees at the job site, since the general contractor normally has the responsibility 
and means to assure that other contractors fulfill their obligations with respect to 
employee safety. "Each employer at a multiemployer worksite, whether in the 
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construction industry or otherwise has the duty to abate hazardous conditions under its 
control and to prevent its employees from creating hazards." Harvey Workover, Inc., 
OSHRC Docket No. 76-1408, 1979 CCH OSHD Paragraph 23830. Big D's pervasive 
control and intervention in subcontractor work practices for safety purposes conclusively 
demonstrates that Big D remains liable for maintaining the safety of Preferred Builders 
employees.1 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414, where the general contractor 
superintends the entirety of the job he is: 
subject to liability if he fails to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the 
details of the work in a way unreasonably dangerous to others, if he knows or by 
the exercise of reasonable care should know that the subcontractors' work is being 
so done, and has the opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of control 
which he has retained in himself. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 414, cmt. b. 
As general contractor Big D remained "solely responsible for initiating, 
maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the" 
HSEB. (R. 510-11). Big D agreed they "shall take reasonable precautions for the safety 
1
 As argued below to the trial court, even absent these well-established 
principles of general contractor liability, Big D's involvement in the safety aspects over 
the course of the project also made Big D liable under either sections 323 'Negligent 
Performance Of Undertaking To Render Services' or 324A 'Liability To Third Person 
For Negligent Performance Of Undertaking' of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Under either of these sections Big D owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in 
overseeing the safety aspects of the HSEB project once they assumed that obligation by 
their at large and intimate involvement with subcontractor safety. 
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of? and shall provide reasonable protection to prevent damage, injury or loss to: (1) 
employees on the Work and other persons who may be affected thereby." (Id.). Big D 
further agreed that they "shall comply with all applicable provisions of Federal, Owner 
and municipal safety laws, rules and regulations as well as building codes to prevent 
accidents or injury to persons on, about, or adjacent to the premises where the Work is 
being performed." (Id.). Big D acknowledged, and it remained uncontroverted in the 
trial court below, that they, the prime contractor, carried responsibility for subcontractor 
compliance with OSHA. (R. 512-13). "In no case shall the prime contractor be relieved 
of overall responsibility for compliance with the requirements of this part for all work to 
be performed under the contract." (R. 512). 
Not only did Big D accept a contractual duty to oversee, superintend and control 
safety enforcement on-site, Big D in fact exerted their ability to control subcontractor 
work with regard to safety regulation. Big D regularly and repeatedly controlled the work 
of subcontractors whenever those subcontractors created unsafe conditions through their 
work. Big D asserted its authority in all manner of work minutia, including that 
subcontractors wear their seatbelts while operating equipment. (R. 513). Big D also 
checked backup alarms on subcontractor equipment. Subcontractors were "required to 
meet all OSHA requirements including chaps, back up alarms on equipment." (Id.). Big 
D superintendent Kevin Burns removed subcontractors from the job-site even for wearing 
tennis shoes, as opposed to work boots. (R. 514). Big D safety logs indicate that Big D 
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controlled or involved itself in the safety of subcontractors on over 43 separate occasions. 
(R. 514). Preferred employee actually believed that Big D was ultimately looking out for 
the safety of subcontractors. (R. 801). 
Prior to beginning any new or unusual task, Big D retained the ability to require 
subcontractors perform a "Hazard Analysis" to identify any risks associated with the new 
task. (R. 516). According to Big D employee Todd Manley: "What we're looking for in 
doing a hazard analysis is principal steps, hazards associated with those principal steps, 
and controls to put in place to reduce, eliminate, or minimize the hazards associated with 
the principal steps of that task." (Id.). Big D superintendents understood that a hazard 
analysis should be conducted whenever something out of the ordinary course of 
construction was undertaken. (R. 516-17). Steve Holt referred to wall 39 as "odd to the 
standard of the job." (R. 518). Kevin Burns, prior to directing Preferred Builders to 
begin work on Wall 39, understood that wall 39 was unique and out of the ordinary. (R. 
517-19). Big D did not request a hazard analysis before sending Preferred to work wall 
39. (R. 519). Moreover, had Big D requested a hazard analysis, the deficient method of 
bracing would most likely have been discovered and remedied. (Id.). 
Prior to the collapse of wall 39 Big D requested, on at least two occasions, that 
subcontractors conduct a hazard analysis. (R. 517). Following the collapse of wall 39, 
Big D requested and received a hazard analysis from Preferred Builders for an unrelated 
task. (Id.). Big D's failure to request a job hazard analysis prior to beginning work on 
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the unusual and unique wall number 39 violated their own rules. (R. 519). Big D's 
pervasive involvement in subcontractor safety mandated that, at the very least, they 
comply with their own rules and request a job hazard analysis prior to beginning work on 
the unique and unusual wall number 39. (Id.). 
Finally, Big D intervened when subcontractors violated OSHA standards while 
engaging in trenching operations. For the time frame June 18, 2003 through April 14, 
2004, Big D interfered with a subcontractor's trenching work a total of 12 different times. 
(R. 513). On these occasions, Big D stopped work when subcontractors worked in a 
trench in a manner that violated OSHA standards. Superintendents Dee Jacobson and 
Layne Murray, on separate occasions, each stopped subcontractors from working where 
the trench failed to comply with OSHA bracing requirements. (R. 515). 
Wall 39 collapsed as a result of bracing which violated both OSHA and ANSI 
regulations. (R. 520). In Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55, ^  23 985 P.2d 892 
this Court held that "[violations of legislative or regulatory standards [OSHA] adopted 
by this court constitute negligence." Both Burns and Jacobson had available for their 
reference the OSHA and ANSI standards. (R. 519-20). Both Jacobson and Burns stood 
by and watched as Preferred worked wall 39, and were watching just prior to collapse. 
(R. 519, 865). Jacobson and Burns failed to exercise their control over safety with 
reasonable care. Big D superintendent Dee Jacobson agreed that it was his particular job 
to predict and eliminate hazards, even for the benefit of subcontractors. (R. 512). Big D 
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superintendent Kevin Burns similarly agreed that it was his particular job to bring 
subcontractors into compliance with OSHA and ANSI standards. (R. 513). Yet, neither 
undertook any steps to correct the situation arising as wall 39 was built. 
Big D employees and safety personnel agree that, absent the ability to complete 
work in compliance with ANSI and OSHA, work should be stopped until it can be 
brought into compliance. (R. 523). Because no form was available to provide stability 
and no other walls were available which could be used as tie off support, wall 39 was not 
erected in a manner which complied with ANSI and OSHA. 
Big D superintendents removed subcontractors for wearing tennis shoes as a safety 
hazard. Big D owed a duty to act with reasonable care in exercising their retained control 
over safety. Failing to reference the ANSI and OSHA standards prior to sending 
Preferred to work wall 39, and failing to intervene to correct the violation of those 
standards represents a failure to exercise reasonable care. Accordingly, summary 
judgment was appropriate, if at all, in favor of Plaintiff with a finding that Big D did in 
fact breach their duty, thus leaving only the issues of comparative fault, causation and 
damages for the jury to decide. 
CONCLUSION 
Big D's pervasive interference with subcontractor workflow, sequencing, methods 
and safety demonstrates retained control in this case. The degree and amount of control 
exerted by Big D led to creation of independent contractors in word only. The 
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subcontractors knew their master's wants and desires and were bound to work in 
accordance with the master's direction, including how and when things should be done. 
In such cases, the exception which shields a general contractor from liability to the 
subcontractor employees does not apply because the general contractor retained control 
sufficiently for liability to attach, even though the control does not rise to a level of 
employer/employee. 
Big D would tell Preferred which wall to build and Preferred would go build it. 
On March 1, 2004, Big D told Preferred wall 39 was the direction to take because that is 
where Big D was headed next. Big D could have sent Preferred home for the day. Big D 
could have sent Preferred to work a wall which did not require additional bracing. Big D 
ignored OSHA and ANSI requirements, choosing instead to advance reinforcing steel 
work ahead of their carpenter work, sacrificing safety for speed. Big D's failure to 
exercise their retained control with reasonable care created the situation which killed 
Michael Begay. Accordingly, Appellant Marlene Begaye respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Big D and remand 
with directions that Big D be found to owe a duty as a matter of law based on their 
pervasive interference with subcontractor work. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 2006. 
reTER W. S U M M £ R I L L 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 6th day of December, 2006,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid to: 
John R. Lund 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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ADDENDUM 1 
TT-115 University of Utah Health Scionces Building 
Concrete Foundation Pour Schedule 
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TT-115 University of Utah Health Sciences Building 
Concrete Foundation / Shear Wall Pour Description 
East Foundation Walls (poured full height) 
Pour E-l CI's. "A-2" to "A-3.5" 
Pour E-2 CI's. "A-3.5" to "A-5.25" 
Pour E-3 CI's. "A-5.25" to "A-5.75" 
Pour E-4 CI's. "B-2" to "B.6-2" 
Pour E-5 CI's. "A-5.75" to "A-7.5" 
PourE-6 CI's. "A-7.5" to "A-9.5" 
Pour E-7 CI's. "A-9.5" to "A-11.5" 
Pour E-8 CI's. "A-l 1.5" to "A-13.5" 
Pour E-9 CI's. "A-13.5" to "A-15.5" 
Pour E-10 CI's. "A-15.5" to "A-17" 
West Foundation Walls 
Pour W-l CI's. "C-2" to "D.7-2" 
PourW-2 CI's. "D.7-2" to "E-3" 
PourW-3 Cl's."E-3"to"E-5.5" 
Pour W-4 CI's. "E-5.5" to "E-7.5" 
Pour W-5 CI's. "E-7.5" to "E-10" 
Pour W-6 CI's. "E-10" to "F-l 1.5" 
Pour W-7 CI's. "F-l 1.5" to "F-13" 
Pour W-7A CI's. "E-14" to "F-14" 
PourW-8 CI's. "E-14" to "E-16.5" 
Pour W-9 CI's. "E-16.5" to "D.7-17" 
Pour W-9A CI's. "C.75-17" to "C-17" 
Area "A" CI's. "A" to "E" & CI's. " 1 " to "2" (approx. 7 pours based on best formwork 
utilization) 
Area "B" CI's. "A" to "C" & CI's. "17" to "20" (approx. 7 pours based on best formwork 
utilization) 
Shear Walls 
Pour S-l CI's. "B.6-2" to "C-2" (poured full height) 
Pour S-2 CI's. "A-2" to "B-2" (poured full height) 
Pour S-3 CI's. "C-4" to "C-5" (poured monolithic w/ S-4) 
Pour S-4 CI's. "B.6-5" to "C-5" (poured monolithic w/ S-5) 
Pour S-5 CI's. "A-5" to "B-5" 
Pour S-6 CI's. "A-7" to "B-7" 
Pour S-7 CI's. "B.6-7" to "C-7" 
Pour S-8 CI's. "C-9" to "C-10" 
Pour S-9 CI's. "B.6-11" to "C-l 1" 
Pour S-10 CI's. "D.7-10" to "E-10" 
Pour S-l 1 Cl's."C-12"to"C-13" 
PourS-12 Cl's."A-ll"to"B-ll" 
PourS-13 CI's. "F-13" to "F-14" 
Pour S-14 CI's. "D.7-14" to "E-14" 
Pour S-15 CI's. "B.6-17" to "C-17" (poured full height) 
Pour S-16 CI's. "A-l 7" to "B-17" (poured full height) 
Pour S-17 CI's. "A-14" to "B-14" 
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|~~ IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 1 
STATE OF UTAH | 
MARLENE BEGAYE, individually and on 
behalf of the heirs of Michael Begay, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BIG D CONSTRUCTION CORP., and, 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DON L. RIGTRUP 1 
Civil No: 040921248 
Judge Robert Hilder 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of ) 
Don L. Rigtrup being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
Don L. Rigtrup, being duly sworn, hereby states and deposes as follows: 
1. I have been retained as an expert by the plaintiff in the above captioned matter. 
2. I am a Safety Engineer at IM Flash Technologies, Inc. (formerly Micron Technology, 
Inc.) in Utah County. I am a workplace safety expert and have been qualified as such in both the 
state and federal courts of Utah. See Attached C.V. 
3. The opinions expressed in this affidavit are my own. 
4. I have had the opportunity to review the written and visual record, including (but not 
limited to) depositions, exhibits, photographs, standards, codes, and standards of care. 
5. Based on my review of these documents, I provide the following opinions and the 
basis for such opinions: 
A. FIRST OPINION: The safety logs provided by Big-D clearly show a 
pervasive involvement in its sub-contractor's safety. Big-D controlled or involved itself 
in the safety of subcontractors on over 43 separate occasions. (See, Big-D Safety Logs 
and Big-D Safety Logs Supplemental) 
B. SECOND OPINION: Big-D's failed to request a job hazard analysis 
prior to beginning work on the unusual and unique wall number 39 violated their own 
rules. Wall number 39 was both free standing (not connected to existing structure) and 
an "inside out" design (the vertical or supporting reinforcing steel was smaller than the 
horizontal reinforcing steel). 
C. THIRD OPINION: Performing the steps involved in a job hazard analysis 
prior to the construction of wall number 39 would have most probably prevented the 
overturning of the wall which caused the death of Mr. Michael Begay. 
D. FOURTH OPINION: Although Kevin Burns had available to him both 
the ANSI and OSHA standards, his failure to reference and comply with the requirements 
of the standards prior to giving permission to begin work on wall 39 further compounded 
the unreasonable risk that wall 39 would collapse. (See, deposition Kevin Burns 55:18, 
57:13) 
E. FIFTH OPINION: At the time that Kevin Burns permitted Preferred 
Builders to begin work on wall 39, a number of other incomplete rebar walls which did 
not require bracing were available for rebar work. Thomas Walters, confirmed this in his 
deposition. Any wall from "Line 17 to Line C" could have been built on the day Mr. 
Begaye was killed. There was not a need to work on the "inside out" wall without a 
supporting form. (See, deposition Tomas Walters 16:16, 29:17) 
F. SIXTH OPINION: A common definition of constructability is: "The 
optimum use of the construction knowledge and experience in planning, design, 
engineering, procurement, and field operations, to achieve overall project objectives." 
Safety is a vital "project objective". By directing Preferred builders to begin work on 
wall number 39, Kevin Burns failed to follow basic principals of constructability e.g. 
Planning (1) There were no forms available to support wall number 39 at the time the 
Preferred Builders crew began to work on the wall. (2) In Big-D's "Concrete Pour 
Schedule" the sequence is: Set interior form and miscellaneous imbeds. Install 
reinforcing steel. ... Set exterior form and pour. If the reinforcing steel on wall number 
39 had been supported by an interior form - it would not have fallen. By violating these 
basic principles of constructability and sequencing, Kevin Bums directed Preferred 
Builders to begin working on a wall which was doomed to fail from the outset because of 
inadequate support. 
G. SEVENTH OPINION: The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 
Policy Statement #350 - Construction Site Safety states: (1) Contractors have 
responsibility for: Maintaining the safety of their employees, their subcontractors' 
employees, and for others in their work area, based on the contractors' control of 
workers, equipment, methods, techniques, sequence of work, and schedule; and (2) 
ASCE believes that site safety responsibility should be assigned to the general contractor, 
construction manager, or other organization with the required expertise and resources, 
who is in control of the project site. The ASCE PS #350 describes the role Big-D took on 
this project. They controlled the sub-contractors (Preferred Builders), they controlled the 
equipment (Forms), they controlled the sequence (both in the construction of individual 
walls and the sequence of which wall would be worked on next). (See Attachment -
ASCE Policy Statement #350) 
I base these opinions on a review of the written and visual record, recognized standards, codes, 
and "standards of care"; and many years of employment as a safety professional and OSHA 
Compliance Officer. I reserve the right to add to or alter any opinions should more information 
become available. 
DATED this / g ^ day of /HouuAy 2006. 
tfONT. RIGfRUP ATf t 
Affiant V ° M 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /£' day of / /Y^c , , 
2006. 
»bW^4.lc I NOTARY PUBLIC 
341 NOftMtttfct* 
aBM*t»p«£:uijit MHO 
^ i s . — 
STATE OF UTAH 
Residing at: £/?(, /t/ /&&<& L*4*L OTM^ 
My Commission Expires: /** ~/^~o € 
ADDENDUM 3 
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS: 
This |ob sue is a new building tor the University ot Utah Health Sciences Department Big D Construction is the 
general contractoi with an on-site job ottice/trailer, and on-site supemsion ot the construction activities 
Preferred Builders is a specialty contractor hired to assemble/build/erect the reinforcing bar tor structural walls 
and columns on the job site 
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION: 
I oui employees 1 unshed up with the work lhe\ weie doing and weie looking roi another project to get started 
Due to snow removal and other activities in the immediate \ iunn\ ot the wills they had been working on, they 
were not able to woik on the next scheduled will Tliev conferred with Kevin Burns ot Big D Construction, 
obtained permission to start work on the southern-most wall ol the building (reported to be the next wall section to 
be built attei the area they had been working, and on the opposite end ot the construction site trom where they 
had been working) This wall will be a basement wall with dirt backfill against it The building area inside this 
wall will be a large open mechanical area housing an emergency generator system tor the building The building 
plans specity that the wall 'n to built as a "Type D" (built with the horizontal rebar on the outside of the vertical 
rebar) The wall sits on a tooting with #6 rebar on 12 inch centers projecting out ot the footing The vertical 
rebar is specified as #6 rebar attached to each, with the inside face 24 tt tall The workers decided to build the 
inside tace ot the wall first, then build the outside face and attach it to the inside as they worked their way up. 
The hori7ontal bars are #9 rebar For the first 12 feet these are installed on 6 inch centers (total ot 24), then an 
additional seven #9's on 12" centers All of these horizontal bars are specified as 33 tt long Above this, the 
ichar is specified to be 31 ft 8 inches long, with an additional four ft9 s on 12 inch centers The workers were 
working trom the north tace ot the wall At the time ot the accident all 24 ot the #9 bars on 24 inch centers had 
been installed, the first 3 ot the #9 bars on 12 inch centers had been installed The workers had installed six 
supports made from 2" X 4" boards at about equal intervals \erticalh along the wall to provide some vertical 
stabilization (bottom 2 X 4's were 16 feet long, with shorter 2 X 4 s spliced to them, with overlap of several feet, 
to reach the top of the vertical rebar) The support on the east end ot the wall had two 2" X 4" boards together 
tor the full vertical height, to provide additional support At the east end, the workers had also installed a 16 toot 
2" X 4 ' board diagonally at approximately a 45 degree angle on the north side of the wall, to add stability (worker 
interviews indicate that this diagonal brace had been installed just before the accident, because the worker on that 
end had felt that the wall was swaying too much) The wall had been listing a little toward the west The 
workers had installed a come-a-long on the wall, to pull it horizontally back approximately plumb vertically from 
east to west (not intended to support the wall north south) The come-a-long was attached to a piece of rebar 
connected to bars sticking out of the foundation about the middle of the wall, with the other end attached to the 
wall assembly 5 bars horizontally to the west on the 2T bar up trom the base The workers had come down off 
the wall, and picked up the next piece of #9 rebar to be installed (a 31 ft 8 inch piece, to be placed 5 tt above the 
top most bar they had installed) They climbed up to the work position, with the bar resting across their arms as 
they climbed (a common industry practice) The workers were positioned on the wall with one on the western-
most 2" X 4 ' , one on the eastern most, and the other two on die 2" X 4" boards closest to the middle of the wall 
When they reached the work position, they connected their positioning chains around the 2 ' X 4" board (and the 
vertical #6 rebar the board was parallel to), then rested the rebar there They then tied the 2" by 4" board to the 
vertical rebar They proceeded to lift the piece of rebar into place, and were nearly completed tying it in when 
the accident happened The next step would have been for two of the workers to move to the other two 2" X 4" 
vertical boards to tie them in to the vertical rebar (the 2" X 4" vertical supports were tied in up to the bar the 
workers were standing on) At that moment, the wall became overbalanced on die west end, with the wall 
starting to tall over The diagonal brace on the east end held as the wall started fall When it snapped, the east 
end of the wall whipped to the ground, where the worker on that end struck a stack of building materials and was 
fatally injured The other three workers all ended up under the mat, but between obstructions The center of the 
rebar mat was held up by a large dirt pile (covered in snow) with an empty 55 gallon drum sitting on it (likely 
acting to decelerate the three workers who received only minor bruises) 
Kevin Bums and Dee Jacobsen of Big D Construction were standing on the dirt access ramp to the work area, 
immediately west of the wall when it fell They had watched the workers climb up the wall with the last piece of 
rebar Both stated that they had not seen any problem with the work/the wall prior to the accident Kevin Burns 
had been in and out of the area throughout the work day, and had noted the workers using their fall protection 
near and had not noted any stability problem with the wall The workers confirmed that they had not conferred 
\s ith am one about gu\ ins: or bracing the wall The workers were positioned on the wall from west to east as 
lolkms Tom Whittaker, Todd Jex, Tim Elliott and Mike Begay 
An engineering levitw of the building structural plans and the rebar wall as built at the time of the accident was 
conducted b\ Dr Warren K Lucas, PhD, PE The results of that review are attached The wall as it was at the 
time ol the accident, was unstable and prone to collapse Two feasible methods to provide stability during 
election aie discussed including horizontal bracing perpendicular to the face of the wall, or building both faces oi 
the wall simultaneously During the investigation, some individuals who were interviewed speculated that if the 
icbai in the toundauon and the vertical lebar attached thereto were #9 rebar, it would have prouded better 
stability ot the wall during erection Although the wall would have been more stable, the review found that the 
wall would still have been outside of good engineering practice, and would have been unstable and prone to 
potential collapse 
WALKAROUND: 
03/02/04 We viewed the site of the accident from the ramp to the west ot the wall that fell The rebar on the 
south side ot where the rebar assembly fell did not have safety caps in place Big D employees were able to find 
caps ihe\ were installed before we went down into the construction site to look at the wall and 2 X 4's that had 
been used to support it We walked around the site of the accident After viewing the accident scene, we looked 
at the remainder of the stack of lumber available for use as needed on the site (I was told the 2 X 4 braces used on 
the wall came from this stack) 
03/05/04 I obtained a copy of the police report and looked at the photos taken by the police at the scene It was 
apparent from those photos that the job site had not been altered prior to my initial site inspection The photos did 
not proxide any additional evidence as to the cause of the accident In the afternoon, I returned to the job site and 
interviewed several employees 
03/11/04 I met with Steve Holt at our office 
03/12/04 I returned to the job site to conduct additional employee interviews 
04/08/04 I returned to the job site to conduct an additional employee interview 
04/09/04 I returned to the job site to interview Layne Murray 
05/06/04 I met with Dr Warren K Lucas, PhD, PE, provided him with copies of plans for the wall and a copy 
of the video of the walkaround portion of the inspection 
05/19/04 Dr Lucas provided a copy of his Findings (see attached) 
CLOSING CONFERENCE: 
A closing conference was held with Don Holt, President, Randy Thurber, Vice President, Brad Holt, Controller, 
Steve Holt, Vice President on 5/21/04 at the Preferred Steel shop offices Todd Manley of Big D Construction 
also attended the closing conference at die invitation of Preferred Builders We discussed the accident, the 
conditions surrounding the accident, and the apparent violative condition found during the inspection. Methods of 
abatement and abatement dates were discussed All standard closing conference topics were covered 
